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TAXING & ZAPPING MARIJUANA:
BLOCKCHAIN COMPLIANCE & THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
(Part 1)
Richard T. Ainsworth
Brendan Magauran
On January 4, 2018, the Trump Administration through Attorney General Sessions
rescinded an Obama-era policy1 that discouraged federal prosecutors from bringing charges in all
but the most serious marijuana cases under the federal Controlled Substances Act, 2 as well as
under the Bank Secrecy Act. 3 Federal law is at odds with state law in the majority of states on
the legalization and subsequent state taxation of marijuana.4 Twenty-eight states and the District
of Columbia have at least partially legalized marijuana. Eight of these states have legalized both
medicinal and recreational use.5 With limited exceptions, legalized sales of marijuana are taxed.
1

The Obama-era policy is contained in five Attorney General guidance documents (1) David W. Ogden, Deputy
Att’y Gen., Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys: Investigations and Prosecutions in States
Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19. 2009); (2) James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Memorandum
for United States Attorneys: Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana
for Medical Use (James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys: Guidance
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013); (3) James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Memorandum for All
United States Attorneys: Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014); and (5) Monty
Wilkinson, Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Att’ys, Policy Statement Regarding Marijuana Issues in Indian
Country (Oct. 28, 2014). These guidance documents have been rescinded.
2
21 USC § 801 et. seq. With this act, in 1970, federal regulation of marijuana began. Congress divided drugs into
five categories. Marijuana was placed in the same category as heroin (Schedule 1). It was deemed to have “no
acceptable medical use,” even though its medicinal value had been observed as early as 1839. (See the research
paper by Irish physician, Dr. Walter O’Shaughnessy, On the Preparations of the Indian Hemp, or Ganja referenced
further in Cannabis Tinctures and Fluid-Extracts, THE ANTIQUE C ANNABIS BOOK, Ch. 4, available at:
http://antiquecannabisbook.com/chap4/Tincture.htm. O’Shaughnessy brought tinctures back from India to the UK.
3
18 USC §§ 1956-57, 1960; 31 USC § 5318. The BSA requires US financial institutions to assist US government
agencies to detect and prevent money laundering. All marijuana transactions, as schedule 1 transactions under 21
USC § 801 et. seq., are therefore money laundering transactions. Thus, the ABA observes:
All banks are subject to the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Under the BSA, banks must
report to the federal government any suspected illegal activity which would include any transaction
associated with a marijuana business. These reports must be filed even though the business is
operating legitimately under state law. ... Financial institutions face significant risk for violating EY
Tax News Update for Thursday, January 18, 2018 (7:00 AM ET) federal law if they offer banking
services to marijuana-related businesses.
ABA,
Marijuana
and
Banking,
FAQ,
February
2014,
available
at:
https://www.aba.com/Tools/CommTools/Documents/ABAMarijuanaAndBankingFAQFeb2014.pdf
4
This paper does not argue for or against the legalization of marijuana. It is only concerned with the taxation of
marijuana by the states, and efforts to prevent fraud and improve related trust issues among the US states. It also
does not consider the federal income taxation of marijuana businesses. In this area there is considerable concern
with IRC § 280 which prevents the deduction of expenses from income generated by the sale of cannabis. The only
reductions from Gross Income allowed are related to the Cost of Goods Sold (COGS). For many taxpayers
determining what expenses count as COGS, and what do not is hard to say. As a consequence, many individuals
and businesses end up afraid to file their taxes and filings.
5
(1) Alaska [AS 43.61.010 & 15 AAC 61] (ballot measure 2, statute enacted November 2, 2014); (2) California
[CA Code, Business and Professional Code, BPC §26000 et. seq. & Health and Safety Code, HSC § 11000, et. seq.;
11357, et. seq.; 11362.7, et. seq.] (Proposition 64, November 8, 2016, medical marijuana effective November 9,
2016, recreational marijuana legalized, effective January 1, 2018); (3) Colorado, [Colo. Const. Art. XVIII, §§ 14 &
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We will consider this federal-state tax (and criminal enforcement) topic in a series of five
papers. The first is introductory in nature. We examine the State tax and enforcement issues
surrounding the legalized marijuana trade. Each of the other papers in this series will consider a
specific marijuana fraud vector and present solutions to it.
Federal marijuana drug enforcement policy under the Obama Administration, created the
space within which the states could legalize marijuana. Federal authority under Gonzales v.
Raich6 and the interstate commerce clause broadly authorizes federal action. It permits granular
federal enforcement of federal marijuana laws within any state, but the Obama administration
limited these concerns and activities.
The now-rescinded AG memos declared that the federal interest in marijuana
enforcement was not comprehensive. In particular, the memo by Deputy Attorney General Cole
(August 29, 2013) limited the federal concern to:
1. Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
2. Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs
and cartels;
3. Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in
some form to other states;
4. Preventing the state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext
for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity;
5. Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of
marijuana;
6. Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other public health consequences
associated with marijuana use;
7. Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and
environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and
8. Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. 7
Staying clear of these eight problem areas seemed to assured the states that they could
deal with marijuana as they saw fit. By reverse inference Cole’s instruction to “all United States
Attorneys,” effectively was a request by the Attorney General that the states exercise tight and
comprehensive physical [items 1, 3, 4, 7, & 8] and financial control [item 2] over all statesanctioned marijuana transactions and their consequences [items 5, & 6]. With State success in
16 on medical and retail marijuana; C.R.S. §12-43.3-101 Colorado Medical Marijuana Code & CRS § 12-43.4-101
Colorado Retail Marijuana Code] (amendment 20 to Colo. Const., November 2000 & amendment 64 to Colo.
Const., November 6, 2012); (4) District of Columbia (Initiative 59, 1998 medicinal; Initiative 71, November 4,
2014 recreational marijuana legalized and into full effect February 26, 2015, but note funding blocked by Congress);
(5) Maine [7 MRS, Ch. 417 & 36 MRS § 1817] (Question 1, November 8, 2016); (6) Massachusetts [MGL Ch.94G
] (Ballot Question 4, November 2016), (7) Nevada, [NRS 453A] (Ballot Question 2, November 8, 2016); (8)
Oregon, [ORS Ch. 475B] (Ballot Measure 91, November 4, 2014); and (9) Washington [RCW 69.50] (Initiative
502, November 6, 2012 ).
6
545 US 1 (2005) (involving agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency who seized and destroyed six marijuana
plants being grown by two California residents for doctor recommended use to treat serious medical conditions
under California’s Compassionate Use Act).
7
James M. Cole, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, (August 29, 2013) available at:
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
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these areas, the Federal government was willing to turn a blind eye to minor infractions of the
federal law. Digital track and trace systems were created to meet this challenge.
Aside from “compassionate use” of medicinal marijuana, the States have seen real
business development and job creation opportunities by legalizing the marijuana trade –
estimates of 250,000 new jobs by 2020 are common.8 In addition, there is revenue to be
generated by imposing income, sales and excise taxes on the marijuana trade. The revenue yield
should be sizeable – estimates are of an annual $28 billion in federal, state and local revenue
from a mature industry; $7 billion in federal revenue; $5.5 billion in business taxes and $1.5
billion in income and payroll taxes.9 For example, if marijuana were to be taxed with a federal
excise tax in the same manner and at the same rate as tobacco, then federal revenue would
increase by $500 million annually.10 State revenue would increase many times more.
State marijuana revenue measures are not harmonized today. Both the tax rates and the
commercial stages at which marijuana transactions are taxed diverge widely.11 Rates range from
8

New Frontier Data, The Cannabis Industry 2017 Annual Report, available at:
https://newfrontierdata.com/annualreport2017/; Debra Borchardy, Marijuana Industry Projected to Create More
Jobs than Manufacturing by 2020, FORBES (February 22, 2017) available at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/02/22/marijuana-industry-projected-to-create-more-jobs-thanmanufacturing-by-2020/#637d43813fa9.
9
Gavin Ekins & Joseph Henchman, Marijuana Legalization and Taxes: Federal Revenue Impact, TAX
FOUNDATION: FISCAL FACT, No. 509 (May 2016) available at:
https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/TaxFoundation_FF509.pdf
10
Id. $500 million is what Colorado raised in the first three years of legalization
2014 from 1-1-2014
$76,152,458
2015
$135,100,463
2016
$198,522,164
2017 through 5-31, 2017
$96,368,540
TOTAL
$506,143,625
VS Strategies, Colorado Exceeds $500 Million in Cannabis Revenue Since Legalization (July 19, 2017) available at:
http://vsstrategies.com/wp-content/uploads/VSS-CO-MJ-Revenue-Report-July-2017.pdf
11
(1) Alaska (wholesale tax imposed on sale from cultivation facility to retail store or manufacturing at $50 per oz.
on flower, and $15 per oz. stems/leaves; medical use not taxed http://tax.alaska.gov/programs/programs/index.aspx?60000); (2) Arizona (state retail sales tax on medical use
marijuana at 6.6% with 2-3% optional city tax - http://www.azdhs.gov/licensing/medicalmarijuana/index.php#rules-statutes); (3) Arkansas (state retail sales tax on medical use marijuana at 4% http://www.mmc.arkansas.gov); (4) California (wholesale tax [cultivation tax] imposed on cannabis entering the
commercial market at $9.25 per oz. of flowers and $2.75 per oz. of leaves [paid over to the distributor], in addition
to the standard retail sales tax of 7.25% and 15% excise tax [collected from consumer by retailer, and paid over to
the distributor] with an exemption from the 7.25% sales tax and 15% excise tax for medical marijuana http://www.cdtfa.ca.gov/industry/cannabis.htm); (5) Colorado (wholesale excise tax is imposed at 15% on the first
sale (transfer) from a cultivation facility to a retail store, and an additional 15% special state retail marijuana sales
tax is imposed on sales to final consumers, however, medical marijuana is exempt from the 15% wholesale excise
tax - https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/tax/marijuana-taxes-file); (6) Connecticut (imposing a $3.50 tax per gram of
medical marijuana when acquired by a Connecticut dealer http://www.ct.gov/drs/cwp/view.asp?a=1514&q=268546); (7) Delaware (imposing no tax and only allowing
medical marijuana - http://dhss.delaware.gov/dph/hsp/medmarocreg.html); (8) District of Columbia (imposing no
tax on medical marijuana, and retail sales not allowed - https://doh.dc.gov/service/medical-marijuana-program); (9)
Florida (medicinal marijuana sales allowed under the Constitutional amendment that was approved, and which
assumed sales tax would apply, but Florida sales tax exempts prescription medications, thus the rate is TBD by 9
months after enactment date of June 30, 2017) (10) Hawaii (imposing a 4% excise tax on medical marijuana, and at
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zero for medicinal use (in Delaware, DC, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Dakota, and Oregon) to roughly 47% (for recreational marijuana, slightly less for
medicinal) in Washington.12 The types of taxes imposed range from standard income, excise,
and retail sales taxes (in most states), to wholesale taxes (Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia). In California, distributors will collect state taxes
from both the grower and the retailer. In some instances, the grower will pay taxes directly to
the State on marijuana for the right to place it into commercial distribution (Rhode Island).
For the most part, state marijuana taxes cascade with excise taxes appearing in the retail
sales tax base. In California, for example, an excise tax is imposed on marijuana flowers at
4.5% on Oahu, but recreational sales not allowed http://health.hawaii.gov/medicalcannabis); (11) Illinois (imposing
a 1% pharmaceutical tax on medical marijuana as an exception to the standard 6.25% sales tax in addition to a 7%
cultivation privilege tax on the cultivation of medical marijuana http://www.revenue.state.il.us/LegalInformation/Regs/Part429/429-110.pdf); (12) Maine (imposing no tax on
medical marijuana, however a 10% tax is imposed on retail sales in addition to a wholesale tax of $1.30 per pound
of processed cannabis - https://legislature.maine.gov/9419); (13) Maryland (imposing a retail sales tax, but rate, if
other than the standard 6% rate, has not determined); (14) Massachusetts (imposing no tax on medical marijuana,
however for recreational use the standard 6.25% sales tax applies in addition to a 10.75% excise tax and a local
municipal tax of 3% - https://www.mass.gov/medical-use-of-marijuana-program); (15) Michigan (imposing a 3%
excise tax on gross receipts of dispensaries in addition to the 6% state sales tax on medical marijuana http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Tax_Policy_Newsletter_November_2016_544007_7.pdf ); (16)
Minnesota (imposing a $3.50 per gram tax in medical marijuana http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/businesses/controlled_substance/Pages/Tax-Information.aspx); (17) Montana
(currently imposing a 4% sales tax until June 30, 2018 when it drops to 2% http://leg.mt.gov/bills/2017/billpdf/SB0333.pdf); (18) Nevada (imposing a 2% medical excise tax, a 10% retail
excise tax, and a 15% excise tax on wholesalers on the first wholesale sale by a cultivator https://tax.nv.gov/Forms/MMT/); (19) New Hampshire (imposing no tax on medical marijuana, recreational use not
allowed - https://www.dhhs.nh.gov/oos/tcp/); (20) New Jersey (imposing a 7% sales tax on medical marijuana,
recreational use not allowed - http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/pubs/tb/tb68.pdf); (21) New Mexico
(imposing no tax on medical marijuana, recreational use not allowed - https://nmhealth.org/about/mcp/svcs/); (22)
New York (imposing a 7% tax on medical Marijuana, recreational use not allowed https://www.tax.ny.gov/pubs_and_bulls/tax_types/med_marijuana_tax.htm); (23) North Dakota (imposing no tax
on medical marijuana in proposed rules due in February 2018 (24) Ohio tax rate TBD after September 2018 when
the Medical Marijuana Control Program is fully operational - https://www.medicalmarijuana.ohio.gov; (25) Oregon
no tax on medical marijuana, but recreational is taxed at retail at 17% with 3% local municipal tax http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/programs/businesses/Pages/marijuana.aspx; (26) Pennsylvania wholesale tax at 5%
excise tax; (27) Rhode Island (imposing a $25 per plant tag for patient/ caregivers on medical marijuana, a 4%
surcharge paid by the seller, and the 7% regular sales tax - http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE21/2128.6/21-28.6-15.HTM; Emergency Regulation CCS 11-01 Compassion Center Surcharge at:
http://www.tax.ri.gov/regulations/other/CCS-01.pdf); (28) Vermont (medical is exempt from sales tax, but pipes,
vaporizers, and other items classified as drug paraphernalia sold in a dispensary are subject to the 6% sales tax, with
local taxes at 1% in addition - (http://tax.vermont.gov/sites/tax/files/documents/MedicalMarijuanaFS.pdf ); (29)
Washington; (imposing a 37% excise tax on medical marijuana sales, but providing an exemption from the standard
state sales tax only for medicinal marijuana – however for recreational use the 37% excise tax applies in addition to
state and local sales taxes) - https://dor.wa.gov/find-taxes-rates/taxes-due-marijuana); (30) West Virginia (imposing
a 10% wholesalers excise tax http://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=sb386%20intr.htm&yr=2017&sesstype=RS&i=38
6)
12
Washington State has a 6.5% retail sales tax, which can be combined with local city and county sales taxes. The
total rate averages 10%. For example, in Seattle, located in King County, the aggregate rate is 9.6% with 6.5%
going to the State, 2.7% going to the city of Seattle, and 0.4% going to the Regional Transit Authority. See:
https://dor.wa.gov/file-pay-taxes/file-or-amend-my-return/instructions-completing-combined-excise-taxreturn/section-ii-state-and-local-retail-sales-tax
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$9.25 per oz. (it is paid to wholesalers by growers). This tax is included in the base when the
wholesaler sells on to retailers. These retailers, in turn, collect an additional 15% excise tax on
consumer sales before the State’s 6.25% state retail sales tax is imposed (along with city and
county sales taxes). Because the 15% and $9.25 per oz. excise taxes are included in the retail
sales tax base aggregate California taxes are much higher than they appear. See figure 1 (below).

Figure 1:
Taxes in the California Supply Chain
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This paper proposes to analyze state marijuana enforcement and taxation through the lens
of European value added taxes (VAT). There is a closer harmony between the EU and the US in
this area than might be expected.
Cascading. The EU VAT was developed in response to the common use of cascading
sales taxes on goods in the EU as they passed through supply chains. This is precisely what is
happening in the US marijuana market.
Open borders. In both the US and the EU, there is an economic union comprised of
semi-independent jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has separate taxing authority to collect revenue
from domestic consumption, based on the market value of the goods sold. In both cases, the
internal borders of the community allow taxable goods to flow freely, without customs controls.
In both the US and the EU this porous border invites criminal fraud.
Missing traders. The most notable fraud in both systems is “missing trader” fraud. This
is a fraud whereby traders ship goods (in the EU) or marijuana (in the US) from low-tax/no-tax
jurisdictions to high-tax jurisdictions. The supplies are sold with tax, followed by the
“disappearance” of the seller. The State of Washington’s aggregate 47% transaction tax on
marijuana is likely to attract criminal organizations nation-wide, just as Hungary’s 27% VAT
does in the EU.
Inter-governmental trust. Open borders and heightened enforcement efforts inevitably
create inter-governmental trust problems. In the US, high-tax jurisdictions (Washington) will
ask low-tax jurisdictions (North Dakota) to help them stem illegal cross-border marijuana flows,
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just as (high tax) Hungary often makes a similar request of (low tax) Luxembourg. States where
marijuana sales remain illegal will be making criminal enforcement requests broadly.
Trust problems will arise in the US, just as they have in the EU. Revenue, business
development, and employment concerns will all weigh against expeditious cooperation. This has
been a continuing area of concern in the EU where trust among the Member States has been
eroded by the burden of shared-enforcement obligations tethered to disproportionate benefit
outcomes. The most recent proposals for change in the EU VAT strongly stress the use of
technology to increase trust. 13
There are also important differences between the EU and the US.
The EU - an idea-rich, but weak central government. The EU has a weak central
government in tax matters. Brussels works hard to harmonize tax rules, reduce tax frauds,
promote Member State trust, and shared tax enforcement, but it is hamstrung. The EU Council14
does not have taxing authority, and it is limited in its ability to otherwise affect tax changes
among the Member States by Article 93 of the Treaty of Rome, which requires unanimous
Member State consent before community tax laws are changed.15
The US - an idea-resistant, but strong central government. The US in contrast, has a
strong central authority in tax matters. The Federal government can raise its own taxes. It plays
a significant role in coordinating tax policy among the states both directly through the commerce
clause, and indirectly through federal tax rules which are commonly adopted by the states.

13

Technology and trust are the themes of the most recent proposals for change in the EU VAT. C OMMISSION STAFF
WORKING DOCUMENT – IMPACT ASSESSMENT, accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards harmonizing and simplifying certain rules in the value added tax
system and introducing the definitive system for the taxation of trade between Member States, SWD(2017) 325 final
(October 4, 2017) at 11, 14 at n. 37, & 16 (emphasis added)
The efficiency of the VAT system needs to be further improved, in particular by exploiting the
opportunities of digital technology and by enhancing greater trust between business and tax
administrations and between EU Member States' tax administrations … the preferred Option 2
notably relies on the assumption that the VAT due on a cross-border transaction in a given Member
State is collected by another Member State that will also have the main responsibility for auditing
the VAT due. …. This [new] system would, in practice, create a collective responsibility whereas
under the then existing system each Member State was individually responsible for the
administration, control and collection of its own VAT. A high degree of trust between Member
States was therefore a pre-condition for the new system.
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/10102/2017/EN/SWD-2017-325-F1-EN-MAIN-PART1.PDF
14
The EU Council is comprised of the Heads of State of the member States. The EU Commission, operating as a
cabinet, would (in the normal course) recommend tax changes to the Council.
15
The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) (later changed to the European
Community). Signed on March 25, 1957. The Treaty has been revised many times, including the Treaty on
European Union, signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997,
and the Treaty of Nice entering in force on February 1, 2003. Through all these changes the wording of the original
Article 93 remained unchanged: the Council, “… acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting with the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee …” shall adopt provisions for the
harmonization of the VAT within the Community.
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With respect to marijuana, however, the federal government has been more hostile than
helpful. As a result, we have the unusual situation where the best ideas on how to build trust and
increase the enforcement and taxation of marijuana may be found in Brussels, not Washington.
This paper considers operational EU VAT measures in tandem with cutting-edge
proposals that lead to harmonization, information exchange, and enhanced enforcement, and
applies them to the US. The proposals engage blockchain platforms, cryptocurrencies, artificial
intelligence risk assessment, and highly secure real-time transaction records delivered to the tax
administration. The measures offered are without question technology-intensive. However, in
each instance they integrate well with the digital track and trace systems currently employed by
US States to control legalized marijuana.
The first proposal is to place the central portion of the marijuana supply chain on a
private blockchain that is shared among the states. Transactions in marijuana will be preserved
in real-time (locally and centrally). Data will be shared among State authorities to aid
enforcement, and tax collection.
The second proposal is for enhance retail security to prevent electronic sales suppression
(ESS). Forms of ESS common in the retail trade include Zappers, Phantomware, Sales
Suppression as a Service, and algorithmic off-shore Zappers in the Dark Cloud. Anti-ESS
regimes are common in the major VAT jurisdictions. They are highly effective, exceedingly
secure, and are the major defense against retail frauds. There is nothing comparable in the US,
with the exception of a single secure installation in Seattle, Washington.
The third proposal is for a limited-purpose crypto currency. This would be a cryptotoken like VATCoin that is digitally minted by the government. For example, CALCoin.
CALCoin would be the only currency allowed for marijuana-related purchases within California.
CALCoin transactions would be placed on a separate public blockchain. CALCoin(s), would be
available only from the State, and would be converted into fiat currency or an alternate crypto
currency only by the State.
The EU is considering versions of the first and third proposal and has adopted many
versions of the second proposal. Progress toward adoption in the EU is always slow because of
the constraints of Article 93.16 Two other economic communities have moved faster that the EU
on the first and third proposals and have begun implementations. Implementations can be
observed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).17 The first proposal is directly incorporated in
The Unified VAT Agreement for the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.18 The
16

Personal e-mail communications with Theodoros Vassiliadis, Head of Unit, Taxation Systems and IT Compliance,
Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union, September 27 through November 15, 2017 in connection with
Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi, Michael Cheetham & Camille Triand, A VATCoin Solution to MTIC
Fraud: Past Efforts, Present Technology, and the EU’s 2017 Proposal, TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming).
17
The GCC is a regional intergovernmental political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries –
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and he United Arab Emirates. It was formed in 1981.
18
Deloitte’s Arabic/English bilingual replication of the GCC VAT Agreement is available at:
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/tax/me_Deloitte-english-GCC-VAT-Treatytranslation-May-7.pdf. Also, Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, The First Real-Time Blockchain VAT:
GCC Solves MTIC Fraud, 86 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 695 (May 22, 2017).
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third proposal of a limited purpose crypto currency is under consideration in the EU as
VATCoin.
One of the best examples of the full set of proposals can be seen in Rwanda. 19 As a
member of the East African Community (EAC),20 Rwanda currently requires encrypted digital
invoices (second proposal) collected centrally in real-time to block ESS with AI risk analysis
applied to the data chain (first proposal), and is waiting for another EAC State to join it in a
shared cryptotaxcurrency on an inter-jurisdictional exchange (third proposal).
MARIJUANA SUPPLY CHAIN
Figure 2 (below) presents the typical marijuana supply chain. The cultivator sells its
yield either to a manufacturer (for example a bakery making brownies or cookies with marijuana
ingredients), or directly to a distributor. The distributor purchases both the cultivator’s and the
manufacturer’s output, then sells on to retailers who re-sell either medicinal or recreational
marijuana to consumers. Any of the businesses along this supply chain may send the marijuana
on hand to a third-party lab to verify quality, and may contract with a third-party carrier to
deliver marijuana. Most of the other Figures in this series of papers will reference the format of
this diagram.
Figure 2:
Standard Marijuana Supply Chain
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States that have legalized marijuana have two concerns with the standard supply chain.
Both concerns harken back to the Cole memo, as the states are responding to the risk of federal
enforcement. The legalization of marijuana burdens states with the responsibility of (a)
monitoring the physical flows of marijuana through the supply chain (making sure the marijuana
does not enter inter-state commerce; making sure it stays out of the hands of minors, etc.), and
also (b) monitoring the fiscal flows (making sure the proceeds of marijuana production do not
end up in criminal hands).

Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Stopping VAT Fraud with DICE – Digital Invoice Customs Exchange 72
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 637 (November 18, 2013) (discussing the initial stages of the solution, the adoption of
digital invoices which are encrypted, digitally signed, preserved locally and sent centrally in real-time, but without
the blockchain element.
20
The EAC is a regional intergovernmental political and economic alliance of six East African countries – Burundi,
Kenya, Rwanda, South Sedan, Tanzania/Zanzibar and Uganda.
19
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The first burden arises because of the Controlled Substances Act, and is based on federal
authority to regulate inter-state commerce. The second burden is brought about by the Bank
Secrecy Act, and federal authority to control money laundering. We will consider both of these
monitoring responsibilities throughout this five-paper series.
Monitoring Physical Flows
The states that have legalized marijuana need to closely monitor the physical flows in
authorized supply chains. The states need to know that legalized marijuana is staying within the
chains (within the state) – not leaking out. The type of physical controls favored by the states are
track and trace (TAT) systems, or sometimes seed-to-sale (STS) systems.21
TAT and STS systems are complex, technology-based control systems. There are
questions about whether they are adequate to the enforcement needs of the state. TAT is a
derivative application of commercial inventory control systems. Radio Frequency ID (RFID) is
applied.22 STS is a derivative application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Internet of Things
(IoT). It comes from the application of technology to “digital food production.”23 Neither TAT
nor STS fully satisfy the enforcement needs of the State. Simply stated, these systems leak at
both ends, and in the middle.
Under TAT and STS each marijuana plant under cultivation is specifically identified
(digitally tagged), and then followed. Tracing includes movements within a cultivator’s
establishment, carriage by third-party transporter along the supply chain, and movement in and
out of every lab where the marijuana is sent for external testing. California, Colorado, Oregon,
Alaska, Maryland, Michigan, Massachusetts, Montana, Ohio and Nevada use the METRC24
system. METRC was developed by Franwell Inc., and is based on RFID technology.25 Tagging
with bar codes (as opposed to RFID chips) is an alternative, less efficient and less effective
method of tracking.26 METRC is the dominant provider in the legalized marijuana market.
21

Seed-to-sale (STS) software is sometimes required by State law to track marijuana in the commercial chain, but it
also provides valuable data to cultivators about plant yields, cultivation method successes and failures, forecasting
productivity, or assessing the effectiveness of extraction methods. Track and trace (TAT) software provides
regulator tools to assess aggregate compliance data from all licensed businesses in the cannabis chain of custody.
MJ Freeway, Track and Trace vs, Seed to Sale, (June 19, 2016) available at: https://mjfreeway.com/blog/track-andtrace-vs-seed-to-sale
22
RFID inventory control is just now achieving commercial success. Wal-Mart’s adoption of RFID twenty years
ago is recognized as an expensive premature failure that has been overcome. See: Barbara Thau, Is the “RFID
Retail Revolution” Finally Here? A Macy’s Case Study, FORBES (May 15, 2017) available at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2017/05/15/is-the-rfid-retail-revolution-finally-here-a-macys-casestudy/#633add5f3294; Matthew Malone, Did Wal-Mart Love RFID to Death? ZDNet (February 14, 2012) available
at: http://www.zdnet.com/article/did-wal-mart-love-rfid-to-death/
23
Two applications of AI and IoT (a Malthouse that regulated higher starch and proteins content, thus higher alcohol
content downstream, and a more complex [138 variable] application to Medical Marijuana cultivation) are presented
by Rob Dolci, IoT Solutions for Precision Farming and Food Manufacturing, 2017 IEEE 41st Annual Computer
Software and Applications Conference 384.
24
METRC is the name of the Franwell system, but it is also a descriptive string of words, functioning as an acronym
meaning Marijuana Enforcement Tracking Reporting Compliance.
25
Franwell Inc. explains the METRC process at: https://www.metrc.com/the-system.
26
There are a number of commercial advantages to using RFID over bar codes. They include (1) read distances – a
whole room can be read with RFID at 10 to 15 foot distances without touching the plants; (2) read speed – RFIDs
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Track and trace systems are based on daily inventory measures reported to the state.
METRC takes inventory with RFID tags. The METRC tagging process is sketched by Franwell,
in ten steps.27 Steps 1-5 occur during cultivation; step 5(a) is the direct sale to a Distributor; step
5(b)-7 is the direct sale to a Manufacturer, or an “infusing” enterprise followed by a re-sale to a
Distributor; step 8-9 is the sale to a Retailer; step 10 is the sale to the final consumer. As a
marijuana plant moves through the supply chain it will be identified within one or more of these
step-points.
There are four “RFID tagging events” in the standard METRC schedule. METRC
explains the ten inventory steps, and the four “tagging events” as follows:
1. Immature plants are grouped and identified by the grower;
2. Vegetative plants (8 inches, or in a 2-inch pot) are tagged (first) with a discrete RFID tag;
3. Flowering plants (light cycle of 12 hours on/ 12 hours off);
4. Harvested plants are cut down, and a “wet weight” is secured;
5. Marijuana is grouped by strain (buds or shake) gets a new (second) unique RFID. The
product is now either:
a. Packaged and sold; or
b. Processed into hash, or infused in another product
6. Packaged product may be transferred to an infusing business
7. An infusing business will repackage the infused products for transfer, and will attach a
(third) unique RFID chip;
8. Packaged inventory is transferred to a retail selling business;
9. Selling business will repackage inventory which is destined for another selling or
infusing business. A (fourth) unique RFID is attached;
10. Retail selling business will sell to consumers from inventory.
In figure 3 (below) the four “RFID tagging events” are represented by letters “a,” “b,”
“c,” and “d.” These figures are placed inside small boxes (to represent the “tagging” process.) A
unique RFID is needed every time a product is transferred from one entity to another in the
supply chain. Daily inventory counts are taken using the RFID chips within each entity, as well
as by every transporting entity.
Each of the major software providers in the legalized marijuana market works in a similar
fashion.28 They strive to become the (only) State-authorized software for the collection of
compliance data at the taxpayer level. In addition, they provide back-end software that operates
the State’s web-portal.

are read 90% faster than barcodes; (3) RFIDs easily identify a single misplaced plant in a room; (4) errors with
barcoding can require the inventory to be started from the beginning, whereas RFIDs simply require a second pass to
be made of a room.
27
The Franwell steps are an expanded version of the traditional commercial supply chain. Franwell expanded it to
isolate the various places in cannabis growth and distribution cycle where RFID chips are attached. Several times
different RFID chips can be attached to a product while it is in the hands of a single member of the supply chain.
28
MJ Freeway’s Leaf Data System and BioTrackTHC are the other major providers.
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Figure 3:
RFID attachments & Daily Inventory measures under METRC system
State Marijuana Oversight Agency

Inventory
a
d
c
b

Recreational
Consumer
Inventory

ns
Tra
Inventory
a

rt
po

c

Manufacturer

b

Tra
n

sp

o rt
Inventory

Inventory

b

Transport

rt
po

d

Transport

Retailer

an
Tr

Cultivator

Distributor

s
an
Tr

sp
t
or

Inventory

Medicinal
Consumer

Lab

New RFID Tag =

a

b

c

d

Daily Inventory Measures =

State enforcement should not be held captive by the available TAT or STS solutions. It is
problematical to consider the State’s job “done” simply by assessing how well a chosen TAT or
STS performs. States need to consider enforcement in an honest, independent manner. From
this perspective, it is reasonably clear that there are fourteen points along the standard marijuana
supply chain where there may be “leakage” into the hands of criminals, or unintended consumers
(minors or cross-border residents). The ultimate goal of any State system is not to simply to
follow METRC or another TAT or STS system, but to use every measure to securely monitor
and plug up each of these leakage points.
Figure 4 (below) numbers the likely leakage points in a marijuana supply chain. The
great majority of these points, [2] through [12], are covered by METRC. There are serious
problems with basic coverage at both ends of the supply chain – at [1], [13], and [14]. But there
are also vulnerabilities within the main part of the chain, [2] through [12].
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Figure 4:
14 marijuana leakage points in the Standard Marijuana Supply Chain
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FRAUD DYNAMICS
There are four basic fraud opportunities for criminal organizations seeking to exploit the
standard marijuana supply chain. Criminal attacks can be:
• Front-end frauds – exploiting openings at point [1];
• Cyber-attacks on the main commercial chain – producing leaks at points [2] through [12];
• Sales suppression fraud – exploiting insecure transactions at point [10]; and
• Back-end frauds – exploiting illegal re-sale opportunities at points [13] & [14].
We will develop these frauds and explore their prevention in sequence. By and large, the
prevention mechanisms (with the exception of the first) have been developed and perfected in
VAT regimes. The reason is simple. Government monitoring of VAT compliance and
government monitoring of the marijuana supply chain both involve securing accurate records of
transactions as goods pass among multiple unrelated entities in close to real-time. Fraud
prevention comes from rapid risk assessment and near immediate detection of unrecorded or
illegal transfers. The following diagram (Figure 5) summarizes the fraud vectors in the basic
marijuana supply chain.
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Figure 5:
Fraud Vectors in METRC-protected Marijuana Supply Chains
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This diagram, and a large portion of the discussion that will follow in subsequent papers
presumes the METRC system is used to monitor marijuana flows, but the same analysis would
apply just as easily if another track and trace or seed-to-sale regime, like MJ Freeway, was used.
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